EMU Enlargement: A Progress Report

1. Introduction

The date of the formal EU accession did not mean the end of the integration effort of new member states to fully participate in the Single European Market, when taken in its broader sense, including the EU common currency\(^1\). Apart from joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), new members are still waiting to join the Schengen zone and have full access to labor markets of certain old member states (OMS). There are also specific transitory provisions in many other chapters of the acquis related to agriculture, environment, infrastructure, free capital movement, taxes, etc.

The purpose of this paper is to concentrate on EMU enlargement, which seems to be the most important part of the unfinished integration agenda, from an economic standpoint and is raising the biggest controversies\(^2\). The advocates of a rapid EMU enlargement stressed the high level of trade and business cycle integration of the NMS with the eurozone, and the potential benefits for the NMS in terms of decreasing transaction costs and the exchange rate risk. Opponents pointed out the costs of meeting the Maastricht criteria and giving up the supposed shock-absorbing role of the exchange rate. There were also some political and economic concerns in the OMS. The former came down to retaining a carrot which could be granted or withheld from the NMS depending on their good behavior, and some understandable concerns about how responsibly they were likely to behave after EU accession. Economic fears were mostly related to the controversial hypothesis that the accession of rapidly-growing countries would increase the inflationary pressure and interest rates in the eurozone, which would have an additional contractionary impact on the slower-growing economies of some OMS (see Rostowski, 2006; Zoubanov, 2006).

Formally, the EMU enlargement process could finally begin and various earlier arguments and hypotheses related to this process could be empirically tested, only after the EU accession of the first ten NMS had been formally completed. At the end of 2006, two and half years after the first wave of EU Eastern Enlargement and the first ERM-2 accession decisions, it seems that a good moment has come to reconsider old arguments and concerns.

This paper has can be seen as a progress report, which concentrates on the following key issues: a short overview of candidates situation in respect to EMU accession (section 2), the formal Treaty’s obligation to join the EMU against an actual freedom of choice of the entry date (section 3), revisiting pros and cons of adopting a common currency (section 4), the relevance of the Maastricht criteria and fears regarding the ERM-2 mechanism (section 5) and

\(^1\) Formally, the concept of Single European Market refers to four basic freedoms, i.e. free movement of goods, services, capital and people. It does not include a common currency (which is the key element of the Economic and Monetary Union, another institutional block of the EU). However, as the decrease in transaction costs has been the main rationale of introducing the Euro, our interpretation, which considers a common currency as the important part of a common market, seems to be economically justified.

\(^2\) The author of this paper and the institute, which he represents (CASE) actively contributed to this debate – see Dabrowski, Rostowski et al. (2006).
political economy and politics of EMU enlargement (section 6). The final part (section 7) provides a summary and policy conclusions.

2. A progress report

The EMU accession process of the NMS could only formally begin after the NMS joined officially the EU, i.e. after May 1, 2004\(^3\). Joining the new Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-2) was the first institutional step on this road. So far, seven NMS have joined this mechanism, thus demonstrating their desire to follow a fast-track accession to the EMU. These have been: Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia (all three joined in June 2004), Cyprus, Latvia and Malta (joining in May 2005) and Slovakia (November 2005). On the other hand, the three biggest NMS - Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – do not have binding and credible plans to join the Eurozone yet. Hungary has officially declared its interest to introduce the Euro at the beginning of the next decade but a serious fiscal crisis, which this country has suffered recently, makes any predictions in this respect very uncertain. Fiscal imbalances (although less severe than in Hungarian case) and political reluctance to address them right away can be considered the main obstacles to the Czech Republic and Poland’s EMU accession. In addition, some leading politicians and political parties currently in power in these two countries run on a somewhat euro-skeptical ideological platform, part of which is a desire to postpone the Euro adoption.

While in the second half of 2005, prospects for a relatively fast EMU enlargement looked pretty optimistic (at least in respect to smaller NMS), they became gloomier in 2006, mostly as a result of a rigid interpretation of the Maastricht inflation criterion. Among the first three countries, which joined the ERM-2 in June 2004 and which had originally planned to introduce the Euro on January 1, 2007, Estonia was effectively discouraged to apply for EMU membership on the grounds that its actual inflation well exceeded the reference value. Lithuania, in which HICP breached the criterion by 0.1 percentage points only, asked the Commission to prepare the convergence report, which concluded negatively on its EMU entry (CR, 2006, p.9). The Commission’s negative verdict was approved by the ECOFIN. Only Slovenia received a ‘green light’ to enter the Eurozone in January 2007.

Lithuania’s case negatively influenced the follow-up debate on prospects and the timetable of EMU accession both in the EU as the whole and in the NMS, discouraging some of them from undertaking more radical adjustment policies, particularly in the fiscal sphere. The timetable of EMU enlargement has become uncertain and has lost political momentum.

3. Is the EMU accession mandatory?

At first glance, the question seems to be wrong as the NMS do not formally have an opt-out option like Denmark and UK. They are legally obliged to join the EMU at some point. However, according to Article 4 of the Treaty of Accession (signed in April 2003 in Athens) the NMS obtained the status of ‘Member States with derogation’ regarding the EMU membership (CR, 2004, p. 2) and the ‘derogation’ period has not been determined. Moreover, joining the EMU requires an active effort by each candidate to meet the nominal convergence and legal criteria of the Treaty.

\(^3\) January 1, 2007 in case of Bulgaria and Romania.
This can take many years if a country is not interested in joining quickly. It is enough to continue a floating exchange rate regime, which excludes both ERM-2 and EMU membership. Thus the NMS possess de facto a great room of maneuver as to when they will adopt the common currency. In extreme cases, it would be possible to postpone EMU membership almost indefinitely. The case of Sweden, which has not joined the EMU or even the ERM-2 yet (in spite of not having the opt-out option), can serve as an example, which perhaps some Euro-skeptical NMS will follow.

In addition, the EMU incumbent members, which must grant an approval to each candidate country to join both the ERM-2 and EMU (by qualified majority voting or in unanimous voting - in the case of determining the conversion exchange rate), possess a great discretionary power to determine the speed of EMU enlargement. So far most of them as well as the Commission and ECB represent a very cautious approach, discouraging NMS from rapid EMU entry (‘don’t rush’ advice) and trying to use all formal opportunities to delay this process.

4. Net benefits of EMU enlargement

If the NMS are not effectively obliged by the Treaty to join the EMU soon and the political attitude of EMU incumbents to fast-track Eurozone enlargement is not necessarily encouraging, what are the economic arguments for doing it? Answering this question requires coming back to the well-known discussion on costs and benefits of joining the common currency area, going back to the seminal papers of Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963). However, the limited size of this paper allows only for summarizing its main findings:

1. Most of the NMS represent a very high share of trade with other EU countries (70-80% or even more). The share of the Eurozone is smaller (due to trade relations with non-EMU members of the EU) but still staying within the range of 40-60% of total trade (with only Latvia and Lithuania representing lower figures). However, when all the NMS join the EMU, this share will increase significantly (through absorption of a substantial intra-NMS trade). Generally, the level of trade and investment integration of the NMS with the EU and EMU is not, on average, worse than in the case of incumbent EMU members, meaning the potential benefits in terms of decreasing transaction costs and decreasing risk of asymmetric shocks.

2. The NMS represent an increasing co-movement of their business cycles with those of EMU countries although the speed of convergence is varied between countries. This means gradually decreasing the risk of asymmetric shocks.

3. According to the endogeneity hypothesis (see Frankel & Rose, 1998), enlarging the Euro area will create additional trade (see Maliszewska, 2006) and investment flows and speed up the convergence of business cycles. These effects can be particularly strong in countries running flexible exchange rate regimes so far.

4. In the world of increasing financial integration, room for sovereign monetary policies in small open economies is gradually diminishing: their central banks cannot risk ‘leaning against wind’ (see Dabrowski, 2004) and must follow, in one way or another, the monetary policy decisions of the monetary authorities of the biggest monetary

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4 For more detail analysis see, among others, Dabrowski, Rostowski et al. (2006); EFN (2006 Spring).
areas (ECB in case of NMS). This puts the main argument in favor of postponing the
EMU entry in question, i.e. retaining an instrument of monetary/exchange rate
accommodation to asymmetric shocks.

5. Joining the Eurozone also means eliminating the risk of currency crises for NMS.
While the last few years did not bring any spectacular financial turbulences upon
emerging markets, this does not mean that NMS are totally immune from this danger.
The end of this unique period of extremely low interest rates may bring about a new
wave of speculative attacks against emerging-market currencies.

6. Rapid EMU entry can also bring substantial fiscal benefits, especially to countries
(such as Hungary and Poland), which represent a high public debt burden, high
primary deficits and must offer higher yields to purchasers of their debt instruments
(all three factors are closely interrelated). For these countries, the strategic policy
decision of early EMU accession would mean starting fiscal adjustment sooner and
enjoying lower interest rates earlier which would both result in lower nominal debt,
other things being equal (see Dabrowski, Antczak & Gorzelak, 2006).

The limited economic potential of NMS comparing to the EMU-12\(^5\) means that the
latter will gain less, in terms of transaction costs and potential trade and investment creation,
than the former. However, for the same reason, economic risks for OMS will also be
negligible. This includes the afore-mentioned concern that the rapidly-growing economies of
the NMS could increase the inflation pressure in the enlarged Eurozone and lead to an overly-
restrictive monetary policy.

5. Re-examination of the Maastricht criteria

The four criteria of nominal convergence (as pre-conditions for joining the EMU)
were formulated in the beginning of the 1990s in the Maastricht Treaty. The purpose was not
merely to enlarge the EU territory and number of member countries, but to create the EMU
as well as a new currency among the countries, whose inflation rates and long term interest
rates varied greatly (in some EU countries inflation well exceeded 10%). Besides, the global
macroeconomic and financial environment was quite different at that time. Some of the EU-
12 members still had capital controls. Global financial markets were less developed and
sophisticated. Therefore the room for the sovereign monetary policy was larger, even in
countries which belonged to EMS.

It is fair to say that from the very beginning, the mutual consistency of these criteria
raised some doubts, and, was in fact, only possible under some additional assumptions. The
two requirements of the fiscal criterion represent the best example here (see Gros, Mayer &
Ubide, 2004). The upper deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP is consistent with the upper debt ceiling
of 60% of GDP only under the assumption of a 5% growth rate of nominal GDP. If average
nominal growth is lower (which has been the case of the EMU as a whole and of most of its
members for a number of years) the deficit must be respectively lower.

An even more serious inconsistency affects both the exchange rate stability and the
inflation criteria. Fixing the exchange rate makes the inflation rate mostly exogenous for the

\(^{5}\) In 2004, the total GDP of 10 NMS amounted to only 5.6% of the total GDP of the future EMU-22 (12 current
members and 10 candidates). The total share of the 5 smallest NMS (Baltics, Cyprus and Malta) amounted to
only 0.7% (see EFN, 2006 Spring, Table 3.2).
monetary authorities, particularly in a world of free capital movement. And inflation differences exceeding what is tolerable under the inflation criterion can result from various sources, such as differences in productivity growth (the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect), changes in demand structure (in favor of non-tradable services), or initial differences in purchasing power parity (PPP) of individual currencies. The NMS, growing faster than the OMS and starting with lower levels of development can experience all these sources of higher inflationary pressure and thus face the danger of breaching the inflation criterion, which is what really happened in the case of the Baltic countries.

An additional difficulty can result from the fact that the reference value for the inflation criterion is calculated on the basis of a simple arithmetic average of the three best-performing EU members, which do not have to be EMU members. With substantial differentiation of inflation rates inside the EU, it is possible that the three best performers, representing a very small share of the overall EU GDP, can set the reference value well below the average inflation rate for the entire EU (and indeed the EMU) and the actual rate of most of their members. Lithuania’s failure to meet the inflation criterion by a very narrow margin in the spring of 2006, as the reference value was set by two non-EMU countries, Poland and Sweden, demonstrates the high probability of the above scenario. Obviously, such an outcome does not say too much about a candidate’s nominal convergence with the current EMU. And what are the effective policy tools to bring inflation down in countries as Estonia or Lithuania, which have run currency boards for many years and have balanced or surplus budgets?

A bit similar inconsistency may also relate to the ERM mechanism itself, which was originally designed as a narrow fluctuation band around a central parity, but was formally widened to a +/- 15% range after the 1992 EMS crisis. This is a kind of hybrid monetary regime under which the central bank tries to simultaneously manage the exchange rate and interest rates (liquidity). Historical experience shows that such a regime is prone to speculative attacks, as was experienced by many current EMU members in 1992-1993 (Wyplosz, 2004).

So far, central banks of the ERM-2 participants have not experienced problems with keeping the exchange rates of their currencies close to the declared parity, except for the National Bank of Slovakia, which had to defend the koruna when it went under market pressure after a general election on June 17, 2006. However, there are two important caveats here. First, five out of seven ERM-2 members have had currency boards or fixed pegs for many years, so, they do not, in fact, run sovereign monetary policies. Second, the last few years have been characterized by a unique calm on emerging markets.

6. Political economy and the politics of the EMU Enlargement

The policy conditionally attached to the EMU accession may serve as a powerful incentive to fiscal adjustment and associated reforms, mostly in the social policy sphere, as has been demonstrated by the experiences of many current EMU members in the second half of 1990s. However, this kind of incentive mechanism can only work if the candidate knows that the reward (EMU membership) is truly available and welcomed by other members.

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6 Lithuania’s 12-month HICP in March 2006 (2.7%) was higher by only 0.4 percentage points than the average inflation of the Eurozone.
I am not suggesting any softening of those entry criteria, which: (i) are very important for the EMU collective economic safety (avoiding free riding under the umbrella of the monetary union); and (ii) remain under the control of each candidate. This relates, in the first instance, to fiscal criteria, which should be closely observed and executed without any waiver, perhaps even with some additional safety margin, taking into account the fact that the NMS are enjoying a unique period of post-enlargement catch-up growth and that they will face serious long-term fiscal problems as a result of population aging (even more than in Western Europe). This means that the NMS should run balanced or surplus budgets (like Estonia does). On the other hand, the professionally competent examination of candidates’ performance must take into account that some of the macroeconomic variables remain under limited control of national economic policy, such as the inflation rate under a fixed exchange rate regime.

Punishing the best macro- and microeconomic performers such as Estonia and Lithuania for missing an inflation criterion, which they are unable to control, issues the wrong political signal. It not only discourages good performers, but also those countries which have a complex fiscal adjustment agenda to undertake on their road to the Euro. This leads euroskeptical and opportunist politicians in countries suffering fiscal problems to ask, “If the reward is problematic and the NMS are not very welcomed in the Eurozone yet, then why should we risk making unpopular decisions?”

This skepticism is additionally fueled by the demands of the so-called real convergence (meaning closing the income per capita gap between the EMU candidates and the Eurozone) or critique of the NMS persistent current account deficit (see Bundesbank, 2006) caused by a large FDI inflow. Both arguments are based on economic misconceptions and do not have a formal ground in the Treaty.

The attempt to slow down the EMU enlargement can be considered part of a wider phenomenon: public opinion and politicians in some OMS have become reluctant not only to continue the EU enlargement process (in respect to Turkey and Western Balkan countries) but also to complete the 2004 and 2007 enlargement agenda. Apart from EMU enlargement, the Schengen zone enlargement and the opening of OMS labor markets to the NMS labor force are also going to be delayed. This may signal a political intention to have, at least temporarily, two categories of EU members, with the ‘core’ built around the current EMU. It is hard to believe, however, that this two-tier membership will benefit the EU and help solve its fundamental economic and political problems, such as finding a compromise on the new Treaty that was frozen by the negative results of the French and Dutch referenda in 2005.

### 7. Summary and conclusions

Until now, the EMU enlargement process has developed slowly. This results not only from ‘post-enlargement fatigue’ and euro-skepticism in some of the NMS (demonstrated by the inability of certain countries i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to address fiscal problems), but also from resistance against admitting the NMS to the Euro area from the ‘incumbent’ side. The negative assessments of Lithuania and Estonia’s eligibility are the best example of this phenomenon. Ironically, this has affected the two best economic performers and de facto long-time members of the Eurozone (they run Euro-denominated currency boards).

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7 And is, in fact, required by the Stability and Growth Pact.
Continuation of the ‘don’t rush’ policy will have negative economic and political consequences both for the NMS and the Union as the whole. First, it will discourage the NMS from carrying out fiscal adjustment and continuing reforms in politically sensitive areas such as social welfare. Secondly, as the potential benefits of joining the Euro area outweigh their costs, delaying the EMU enlargement results in net welfare losses for the NMS and delays hopes of their income catching up with the OMS. It will also limit the net benefits for those NMS, which join the EMU first because some their important trade partners will remain outside the common currency area. Thirdly, financial markets have until now assumed a scenario of relatively quick EMU enlargement. This explains the relatively low NMS risk premiums. However, when investors realize that this process will be postponed for good the risk premiums will probably increase, thus deteriorating growth perspectives and adding to fiscal problems. Any adverse shock such as political problems in any single country or financial turbulence on other emerging markets may trigger a financial crisis on the periphery of the enlarged EU. Fourth, applying ‘second-rate’ status to most NMS will negatively influence the Union’s ability to meet key economic and political challenges in the near future.

The ‘don’t rush’ policy should be abandoned in favor of clear incentives to speed up the fiscal adjustment of the EMU candidates as the precondition of their healthy membership in the common currency area, even with the additional safety margin comparing to Maastricht criteria. On the other hand, the inflation performance should be interpreted more flexibly at least reflecting its partly exogenous character under the fixed exchange rate regime. This flexibility may go in two directions:

1. The inflation criterion should be applied to assess macroeconomic (mostly monetary) policies in the period preceding the adoption of the ERM-2 central parity and then should be subsequently abandoned. It should be completely abandoned in the case of EMU candidates running well-established euro-denominated currency boards.

2. In addition, the reference value should relate to the average inflation in the Eurozone instead of the average of the three best performing EU members.

References


