

Euro – How Big a Difference: Finland and Sweden in Search of Macro Stability *


Euroframe Warsaw 24 May 2013 Vesa Vihriälä

* Based on ETLA Report 7/2013 by Paavo Suni and Vesa Vihriälä

Background

- The euro crisis => new interest in the pros and cons of the of membership in the EMU
- □ Different choices of Finland and Sweden an interesting test case
 - Economies and societies structurally rather similar
 - Many parallels also in macroeconomic history
- The EMU decisions only partially on economic grounds
 - Sweden: perception of inadequate flexibility for the EMU
 - Finland: primarily a political choice

Similarity of Finland's export structure (HS2) vis-à-vis other EU countries' export structures in 2012




Macro performance in the EMU period

- GDP
 - until 2007 almost identical
 - Finland faster in 2007 and 2008 due to global boom favouring Finnish exports
 - Crisis hit harder and recovery slower in Finland
- Employment:
 - a parallel evolution throughout the EMU period
- Inflation:
 - marginally faster and more variable in Finland
- Effective exchange rate
 - on average stronger relative to 1999 in Finland
 - an important swing in Sweden during the crisis

GDP in Finland and Sweden


Quarterly data, index 1999/1 = 100



Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.

Exports of goods and services in Finland and Sweden


Quarterly data, index 1999/1 = 100



Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.

Total domestic demand in Finland and Sweden

Quarterly data, index 1999/1 = 100




Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.

Employment rate


Employed per cent of population of 20-64 years of age

Finland —Sweden




Source: EU Commission

Inflation: annual CPI change, %



Effective exchange rate in Finland and Sweden

Quarterly data, index 1999/1 = 100*



^{*} Currency strengthens, when index numbers rise. Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.


Price and exchange rate stability before and after the start of EMU

| | | 1985/1-1998/4 | | 1999/1-2012/4 | | |
|--------------------------------|-------|---------------|---------|---------------|---------|--|
| | | Sweden | Finland | Sweden | Finland | |
| Inflation (National concept) | Mean | 4.3 | 3.2 | 1.5 | 1.8 | |
| | Stdev | 3.2 | 2.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Private consumption deflator | Mean | 4.9 | 3.4 | 1.5 | 2.0 | |
| Change in per cent) | Stdev | 3.3 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 1.3 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Effective exchange rate, level | Stdev | 6.6 | 6.3 | 4.3 | 4.8 | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |


A counter factual simulation for Sweden in "EMU"

- NiGEM
 - A New Keynesian estimated structural model
 - Demand determines production in the short term
 - Backward or forward looking expectations
- The counter factual
 - Imposing the EA monetary policy on Sweden as of 1/1999.
 - EA steering rates and short-term interest rates.
 - Fixing the SEK in euros, about 9.5 kroner per euro.


Three-month interest rates in the Euro Area and in Sweden, %




Calculated and baseline effective exchange rate in Sweden, 1999/1 = 100*




Deviation of the simulated GDP from the baseline in Sweden, %



Simulated and baseline GDP for Sweden and baseline GDP for Finland, 1999/1 = 100



Simulated and baseline inflation rate* in Sweden, %



^{*} Private consumption deflator.

Conclusions

- □ An independent monetary regime softened the impact of the 2008/2009 shock on Sweden and made the recovery faster
- But no long-lasting impact on the GDP level
- ☐ The positive effects of largely due to stabilising exchange rate reactions, which may not obtain in all shock situations
- □ The relative discrepancy in the GDP level between Sweden and Finland in 2012 cannot anymore be explained by the different monetary regimes
- Monetary regimes matter, but the different choices of Sweden and Finland have not been very important for the relative performance of the two economies